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Recent Cases
TORTS-RE_ IPSA LOQUITER.--Defendant dairy delivered two bottles of
milk to plaintiff. When plaintiff picked up the bottles, one collapsed,
permanently injuring his hand. Plaintiff, alleging the accident and
the injury, sought damages from defendant dairy company under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant produced evidence that its
bottles were carefully inspected in the washing and filling process.
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, and plaintiff
appealed. Held: Affirmed.' Res ipsa loquitur is not sufficient to take
the buyer's case to the jury after the seller shows that it exercised
reasonable care mn ts methods of processing and inspecting its product
during the course of manufacture. Rowe v. Oscar Ewing Distributing
Co., 357 S.W 2d 882 (Ky. 1962).
Generally, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that in accidents
of a certain character, the attendant circumstances may create an in-
ference of negligence sufficient to take the case to the jury. "[W]here
the thing which causes the injury is under the control and manage-
ment of the defendant, and the injury is one that in the usual course
of events will not happen without want of due care on the part of
the person exercising control or management, there is sufficient
evidence, if no explanation is offered by the defendant, to warrant
a finding that the injury was due to the defendant's lack of care."2
In Kentucky the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where an
instrumentality controlled by the defendant causes an injury to the
plaintiff under circumstances which, according to the common knowl-
edge and experience of mankind, creates a dear inference of negli-
gence. 3 However negligence is not presumed from the mere fact of
an accident or injury.4 It is the court's duty to determine whether, as
a matter of common knowledge and experience, the accident would
not have happened without negligence.5
1 The court also affirmed on the ground that, since there was no sale of the
bottle within the meaning of the Uniform Sales Act, no warrant for fitness or
merchantability extended to the bottle. See the comment on the warranty aspect
of this case discussed in this issue, minfra, p. 774.
2 Annot., 4 A.L.R. 2d 466 (1949); see generally 38 Am. Jur. Negligence
§§295-355 (1941).3 Lewis v. Wolk, 312 Ky. 536, 228 S.W 2d 432 (1950).
4 Cox v. Wilson, 267 S.W 2d 83 (Ky. 1954); Porter v. Cornett, 806 Ky.
25, 206 S.W 2d 83 (1947); Potter v. Consolidation Coal Co., 276 Ky. 404, 124
S.W 2d 68 (1938).
5 "The separate circumstances of each case must be considered and from them
it must be first decided whether according to common knowledge and expenence
(Continved on next page)
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In the principal case, the court felt that the defendant had shown
the bottles were carefully handled while under the defendant's con-
trol; consequently, the cause of the accident was a matter of conjec-
ture. Since the negligence could not be reasonably inferred from the
circumstances, the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict. Thus,
where the plaintiff relies upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and
merely prove injury, and the defendant shows that it exercised due
care, then the court will not allow the case to go to the jury. How-
ever in an earlier case, Lewzs v. WolkG the court held that a jury
might infer negligence notwithstandnig the defendant's evidence of
due care.
7
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a reflection of probabilities
of negligence only, and not of possibilities.8 In the principal case,
the milk bottles broke because of: (1) the defendant's failure to in-
spect or negligent inspection, (2) the defendant's improper handling
after inspection, including rough handling during transportation,
(3) the plaintiff's negligent handling, or (4) a defect which was not
discoverable by any feasible inspection processes. The defendant's
evidence was that its inspection was adequate to disclose any defects
sufficient to cause the collapse of the bottle.9 Thus alternative (4)
is ruled out; that is, the alternative that the accident occurred with-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
of mankind, tlus accident could not have happened if there had not been negli-
gence. The primary responsibility for this decision rests upon the court. In
other words, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not involve the establish-
ment of the ultimate fact by circumstantial evidence or of presumed negligence
merely because of the injury. So the first step n connection with its use is to
classify the type of accident and decide whether it is of that class containing
only those accidents which would not in the ordinary course of things occur
without negligence." Cox v. Wilson, supra note 4, at 84.
6812 Ky. 536, 228 S.W 2d 432 (1950).
7,In Lewis v. Wolk, supra note 6, at 541, 228 S.W 2d at 435, the court
said, "[T]he presumption or inference of negligence is not destroyed by the de-
fendant's evidence tending to show the contrary. This conclusion is inescapable
when we consider the very basis of the doctrine. Because the defendant had con-
trol of the instrumentality and the accident would not ordinarily have happened
without negligence, the very thing itself is positive proof of the defendants
fault. If by demal he may escape a jury determination that the probability speak
louder than his testimony, the doctrine loses its fundamental force." In Vernon
v. Gentry, 334 S.W 2d 266, 268 (Ky. 1960), the court said, "We are urged to
determine that the explanation of defendant conclusively proves she was not
guilty of any act of negligence as a matter of law. To do this would be tanta-
mount to saying that when a defendant deies he was negligent, and presents
evidence to that effect, then the court has no alternative but to believe such evi-
dence and refuse to allow the jury to make a determination. It was the
proper function of the jury to determine whether defendant satisfactorily re-
butted the presumption raised by the happemng of the accident."8 But see Jafee, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1951-
1952).
9 Rowe v, Oscar Ewmin Distributing Co., 3$7 S.W 2dl 882, 883 (Ky. 1962),
[Vol. 51,
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out negligence on someone's part is precluded from consideration.
10
Alternatives (1) and (2) would require the submission of the case to
the jury. Therefore, since the case did not-go to the jury, the court
must simply have disbelieved the plaintiff's evidence of due care under
alternative (3). But it is improper for the court to direct a verdict
upon its disbelief of testimony.11
The reason for the doctrine is that where the control of the ting
which caused the injury is exclusively in the defendant, it is witin
his power to produce evidence of the actual cause, which the plaintiff
is unable to produce. 12 But if the defendant, in producing his evi-
dence, can overcome the inference of negligence, he is entitled to a
directed verdict;iS otherwise the question is for the jury.
14
The result in the principal case seems consistent with the court's
"integrity of the bottle" doctrine. 15 This doctrine, applied predom-
inantly in cases involving foreign objects in the bottle requires the
plaintiff to prove that no third party could have tampered with the
bottle. It is virtually impossible for a plaintiff to prove tis. The
unfair result of the court's reluctance to impose liability in such
bottle cases can be seen by an examination of case law.16
Is this a case in which the court directed the verdict for the de-
fendant because it disbelieved the plaintiff's evidence? If so, the
court clearly exceeded its judicial authority. Or, is this a case where
10In Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hams, 816 S.W 2d 128 (Ky. 1958),
a bottle exploded and destroyed the plaintiffs eye. The plaintiff introduced ex-
pert testimony that the explosion was caused by internal pressure; defendant
introduced expert testimony that the explosion was due to an external impact.
Here the chances of the bottle breaking during the plaintiffs handling were much
greater than the principal case, and yet the court used the defendant's evidence
of careful inspection methods against the defendant, believed the plaintiff, and
held that the evidence raised a question for the jury.
11 In Elliottv. Drurys Admnx, 304 Ky. 93, 96, 200 S.W 2d 141, 148 (1947),
the court held: "'he direction of a verdict for a defending party is not author-
ized unless, after admitting the testimony offered by the closing party and after
admitting every reasonable inference to be deduced from the facts- proven to be
true, the cause of the accident is then and thereupon unsupported by legal evi-
dence. However much of the evidence of a defending party, the latter is
still entitled to have the jury pass upon the issue of his case, assuming that the
latter has nevertheless produced evidence of probative value in support of such
case." The court cited seven cases to support this holding.
12 Johnson v. Stevens Bldg. Catering Co., 323 IlM. App. 212, 214, 55 N.E.
2d 550, 552 (1944).
is Vernon v. Gentry, 334 S.W 2d 266 (Ky. 1960); Black Mountain Corp. v.
Partins Admr, 243 Ky. 791, 49 S.W 2d 1014 (1932).
14 Lewis v. Wolk, 312 Ky. 536, 228 S.W 2d 432 (1950).
5 Ashland Coca-Cola Co. v. Byrne, 258 S.W 2d 475 (Ky. 1953); Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Curtis, 302 Ky. 199, 194 S.W 2d 375 (1946); Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Creech, 245 Ky. 414, 53 S.W 2d 745 (1932). But see Coca-
Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W 778 (1926).
16 Ibid,
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the court reached its verdict because the instrumentality was a bottle?
If so, it is another application of the court's "integrity of the bottle"
doctrine, thus perpetuating a manifestly unjust line of authority.
Wayne T Bunch
COMMERCIAL LAW-IMPLIED WARRANTIES-PASSAGE OF TrTL.- De-
fendant dairy delivered bottles of milk to the home of plaintiff who
received severe injuries when one of the bottles collapsed in his hand.
Plaintiff alleged: (1) that the defendant dairy was negligent m its
manufacturing processes; and (2) that an implied warranty of fitness
or merchantability extended to the bottle, that this warranty was
breached, and that the defendant was liable for special damages.
This comment discusses the holding and reasoning of the court on
the warranty issue; the negligence issue, t.e., res ipsa loquitur, is dis-
cussed supra p. 771.
Evidence at the trial tended to show that the object for sale be-
tween plaintiff and defendant was milk and that the bottle was merely
lent to plaintiff as an incidental service in connection -ith the sale.
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. Held: Affirmed.
Since there is no sale of the bottle no warranty of fitness or merchant-
ability extends to it. Rowe v. Oscar Ewing Distributing Co., 357 S.W
2d 882 (Ky. 1962).
As plaintiff's injuries occurred in 1959, this case is governed by
the Uniform Sales Act,i which was replaced in 1960 by the Uniform
Commercial Code.2 Plaintiff relied on section 15 of the Sales Act
which provides in part:
(1) Where the buyers, expressly or by implication, makes known to
the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required,
and it appears that the buyer relies on the sellers skill or judg-
ment there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reason-
ably fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who
deals m goods of that descnption there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.3
It seems that if plaintiff had received injuries from impurities in the
milk itself, either of the above subsections, taken with the special
damages section of the Sales Act,4 would have given plaintiff a basis
iKy. Acts ch. 148 (1928).2 Ky. Rev. Stat. ch. 355 (1960) [Hereinafter cited as KRS] [The Uniform
Commercial Code is hereinafter referred to as Code m the text].
SKy. Acts ch. 148, at 487 (1928).4 Ky. Acts ch. 148, at 514 (1928).
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